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In 2005, at the Gleneagles G8 meeting, OECD donors committed 
themselves to substantially scaling up their aid to low-income countries 
as a means to boost financing for the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). However, Official Development Assistance (ODA) to these 
countries has remained low relative to their Gross National Incomes 
(GNI) and has continued to be volatile and unreliable. This Development 
Viewpoint offers some suggestions on how the role of ODA could be 
strengthened for a post-2015 development agenda (see Martins 2010).
Table 1 shows how ODA to low-income countries declined from 7.9% 
of the recipients’ GNI during 2000-04 to 7.7% during 2005-08 – after 
having risen from 7.2% in 1995-99. This share had been significantly 
higher during 1990-94, at 9.8%.  
How have low-income countries fared relative to middle-income 
countries? Between 2000-04 and 2005-08, the share of ODA going 
to low-income countries, as compared to middle-income countries, 
dropped from 43.7% to 39.4%.  In other words, a little over 60% of ODA 
was still directed to middle-income countries during 2005-08. This was 
only slightly lower than the figure for 1990-94, namely, 63%.
Hence, from the perspective of low-income countries themselves, 
donors have not followed through on their pledge to finance a 
‘big-push’ to achieve the MDGs. In fact, relative to the size of their 
own economies and relative to middle-income countries, they have 
witnessed a reduction.
In addition, ODA has not proven to be a reliable source of financing. 
Table 2 reports trends in the ‘coefficient of variation’, a measure of 
deviations from an average value. When the coefficient is larger, there is 
more volatility in the variable being measured. 
Note that the coefficient for ODA flowing to low-income countries rose 
from 4.7% during 1990-94 to 11.5% during 1995-99, and then to 27.1% 
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in 2000-04. Despite declining in recent years, this coefficient remained at 
18.4%, a historically high level. 
In middle-income countries, there has been a steady rise in volatility, 
with the coefficient of variation rising from a low of 4.5% during 1990-
94 to a high of 12.9% during 2005-08. Therefore, for both low-income 
and middle-income developing countries, aid volatility has been a 
significant, if not intensifying, problem.
Even if ODA flows are raised in the medium-term, an increase in their 
volatility (year-on-year variation) could undermine their effectiveness. 
This problem is aggravated when aid is unpredictable - i.e. commitments 
are poor predictors of actual disbursements. Aid shortfalls will often lead 
to delays in the implementation of development projects and therefore 
to compensating increases in domestic financing. 
An additional problem is that aid inflows into a recipient country tend to 
increase when its growth is rising but decline when it is falling—that is, 
aid is pro-cyclical. This is precisely the opposite of the optimal pattern in 
accordance with country need.
Macroeconomic Framework
Hence, while foreign aid inflows can provide valuable finance for 
recipient countries, their magnitude and disbursement patterns can 
create significant problems. Examining the recent role of ODA in 
promoting the MDGs in low-income countries can offer useful clues on 
how to craft a more development-oriented post-2015 MDG agenda. 
Critical to this effort would be a supportive macroeconomic framework, 
which would allow governments and central banks to utilise ODA 
effectively. Such a framework should be geared to promoting long-term 
growth and development, not short-term macroeconomic stability 
supplemented by poverty alleviation. Donors should adopt a similarly 
long-term approach in their disbursement of ODA. 
In such an approach, the focus of fiscal policy would be on substantially 
scaling up public investment programmes in economic and 
social infrastructure. Monetary policy would play a secondary but 
complementary role of accommodating the fiscal expansion through 
encouraging domestic credit and maintaining low real rates of interest. 









ODA (% GNI) 
Low income 9.8 7.2 7.9 7.7
Middle income 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4
ODA (% Group Total) 
Low income 37.0 38.3 43.7 39.4
Middle income 63.0 61.7 56.3 60.6









Low income 4.7 11.5 27.1 18.4
Middle income 4.5 8.5 12.9 12.9
Table 2: The Volatility of ODA (Coefficient of Variation, %)
Source: World Bank (2010). World Development Indicators, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog
Source: World Bank (2010). World Development Indicators, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog 
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But this policy stance would be incompatible with restrictive inflation 
targeting.
Aid inflows should concentrate on financing the scaling up of public 
investment since it is likely to generate significant multiplier effects in 
the economy as well as accelerate poverty reduction. Public investment 
would ‘crowd-in’ private sector investment through lowering business 
costs (e.g., for transportation) and improving skills (e.g., through 
vocational training). Such active fiscal policies would reduce supply-side 
constraints, which are common in underdeveloped economies, as well 
as stimulate higher aggregate demand.
Aid Commitments
In line with this focus, donors should provide aid commitments with 
longer time horizons and anchor their commitments in the recipient 
country’s long-term development strategy. This would enhance a 
country’s macroeconomic conditions since central banks could reduce 
their current excessive build-up of international reserves. 
Such a build-up has been designed to help the central bank hedge 
against volatility in the real exchange rate, which can sometimes be 
exacerbated by aid volatility itself. Firmer aid commitments would 
also reduce the need of governments to resort to expensive domestic 
borrowing and enable them to foster a better allocation of resources 
between capital and recurrent spending. 
Responding to the problem of aid volatility, some concrete proposals 
have recently been made on how ODA could help smooth and sustain 
domestic expenditures. One of these is the proposal for a ‘foreign 
reserve buffer’, which uses aid essentially as an insurance mechanism. 
Under such an arrangement, an aid windfall could be used partly to 
increase the aid buffer, which would then be deployed during aid 
shortfalls, when foreign assistance was most needed.
Another promising idea is the indexing of aid disbursements to 
external shocks, such as terms of trade shocks. This mechanism would 
automatically trigger counter-cyclical aid inflows when they were most 
needed, such as providing vital foreign exchange when export receipts 
and foreign investment were down, and stimulating aggregate demand 
in economic downturns when domestic revenues were low.
The success of such initiatives would still have to rely on the strength of 
a country’s macroeconomic policies. For example, some management of 
the exchange rate and capital flows would be necessary, in addition to 
revamping fiscal and monetary policies.
Managing the exchange rate, instead of leaving it fully flexible (and 
volatile), would be consistent with a development strategy that relies 
on accessing large inflows of foreign resources. Under a managed 
regime, the central bank would intervene in currency markets when 
capital inflows (and outflows) are sizeable and unstable. Such a regime 
could effectively absorb aid inflows without precipitating inflationary 
pressures and associated interest rate hikes.
At the same time, there would be some need to manage the capital 
account, particularly in resource-rich economies. One such proposal is 
a system of foreign exchange permits, which would manage the sale 
of foreign exchange to the domestic private sector. This system could 
steer foreign exchange towards the importing of capital goods (for 
example, machinery and equipment), which could enhance a country’s 
productivity. It could also help slow the recurrent outflow of private 
capital from low-income countries. 
This Development Viewpoint has highlighted recent problems in the 
declining relative magnitude of ODA and its increasing volatility, which 
have hindered achievement of the MDG agenda. In response, it has 
offered some recommendations on how low-income countries could 
modify their macroeconomic policies to sustain an effective post-2015 
development agenda and how donors could institute policies and 
mechanisms to actively support such an orientation.
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